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CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS TO
BALLOT-MEASURE CAMPAIGNS
On June 6, 1972, California voters defeated a ballot measure
entitled the Clean Environment Act (Proposition Nine). Propo-
nents had termed the vote "the great test between the
people... and the business and industrial despoilers of our land,
air and sea,"1 viewing their opponents as "corporate crooks"
engaged in an intentional attempt to deceive the public. 2 The
campaign against the initiative was well financed, supported al-
most exclusively by corporate contributions,3 and by election day
it had become as much an issue as the proposed legislation itself.
4
The campaign raised many questions about the legitimacy of
corporate participation in politics and stimulated new debate
about the proper use of the substantial economic power of large
corporations in initiative campaigns.
Echoing warnings sounded at the turn of the century, oppo-
nents of corporate involvement in politics fear that the integrity of
the electoral process is threatened by such activity. 5 They con-
tend that the concentrated financial power of corporations jeop-
ardizes individual freedom and responsibility for the successful
functioning of the electoral process. This threat to the democratic
process increases as campaign costs spiral, making the need for
massive funding more imperative.6
1 San Francisco Chronicle, June 2, 1972, at 22, col. 3.
2 1d., June 5, 1972, at 15, col. 4.
3 Of the $1,484,971.25 collected by Californians Against the Pollution Initiative, the
group opposing Proposition Nine, approximately 92 percent was contributed by corpo-
rations. Statement of Receipts and Expenditures, on file with the Secretary of State,
Sacramento, California.
The corporations referred to in this article generally include the "large, publicly-held
corporation, whose stock is scattered in small fractions among thousands of stockholders,"
denominated endocratic corporations in Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends Is Corpo-
rate Management Responsible?, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 333 n.2 (E.
Mason ed. 1959). Moreover, those closely-held corporations which possess sufficient
resources to have an impact on the financing of ballot-measure campaigns are also within
the scope of this discussion.
4 See the paid advertisement by People for the Clean Environment Act, San Francisco
Chronicle, June 2, 1972, at 22, col. 3.See also id., June 7, 1972, at I, col. 4.
5 See E. EPSTEIN, THE CORPORATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 20-37 (1969), for general
discussion of the historic involvement of corporations in politics. L. BRANDEIS, OTHER
PEOPLE'S MONEY (1914) and E. SIKES, STATE AND FEDERAL CORRUPT-PRACTICES LEGIS-
LATION (1928) report public concern during the early twentieth century about such
corporate activities.
'See generally E. EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 187-90; A. HEARD, THE COSTS OF
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Federal law 7 and the statutes of many states8 prohibit corporate
contributions to political campaigns. These prohibitions are based
on two considerations: a belief that the electoral process must be
purified by destroying the influence over elections that corpo-
rations exercise through their financial contributions, and a desire
to protect shareholders from the use of corporate funds for politi-
cal purposes without their consent.9
It is not clear, however, that the perceived dangers of corporate
participation in politics are real dangers, or that outright prohibi-
tion of such participation is the best means of preserving the
democratic character of the electoral process. Any controls on
corporate spending in initiative campaigns should be firmly based
upon articulated conceptions of the corporation's legitimate role
in society. This article examines some of these conceptions and
their relationship to the process of direct legislation and thereafter
makes recommendations for workable controls in light of that
analysis.
1. CURRENT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
During the Progressive Era many states enacted laws which
still form the foundation for many electoral controls. Because
traditional legislative machinery was universally felt to be in-
adequate0 provisions permitting the popular enactment of legis-
lation were adopted to make government more responsive to the
will of the electorate. These provisions constitutionally estab-
lished the electorate's rights to initiate legislation independently of
the legislature and to review laws already enacted. 1 Twenty-three
DEMOCRACY (1960); COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, FINANCING A BETTER
ELECTION SYSTEM (1968); H. PENNIMAN & R. WINTER, CAMPAIGN FINANCES: Two
VIEWS OF THE POLITICAL & ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS, 45-46 (197 1); Bottomly, Corrupt
Practices in Political Campaigns, 30 B.U.L. REV. 331 (1950); Comment, Corporate
Political Affairs Programs, 70 YALE L.J. 821 (1961); Harris, The Froghair Problem,
HARPER'S, May, 1972, at 12; Hazard, It Takes Money to Get Elected, ATLANTIC, Feb.,
1960, at 92.7 The federal prohibition is contained in 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970), as amended, Act of
Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 205, 86 Stat. 3.
8 For example, of the twenty-three states permitting referenda and initiatives, see note
12 infra, ten prohibit corporate contributions of any kind to ballot-measure campaigns:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-471 (1956); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 55, § 7 (Supp. 1972);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.919 (1967); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 129.070 (1966) (Section
129.075 provides that a corporation may campaign in connection with any law directly
affecting it.); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-1444 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-1129
(1968); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 16-20-08 (1971); ORE. REV. STAT. §260.472 (1971); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 12-25-2 (1967); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 22-356 (1959).
9 See United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 113 (1947).
1
°See V.O. KEY & W. CROUCH, THE INITIATIVE AND THE REFERENDUM IN
CALIFORNIA 442 (1939). See also E. SIKES, supra note 5; Radin, Popular Legislation in
California, 23 MINN. L. REV. 559 (1939).
11 V.O. KEY & W. CROUCH, supra.note 10, at 423.
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states currently permit direct legislation by initiative and referen-
dum.
12
Additionally, in order to "secure the freedom of elections from
improper influences," 1.3 corrupt practices acts, modeled on the
British act of 1883,14 were also enacted. Campaign finance con-
trols on corporate contributions were included in the acts to
combat the use for political purposes of large amounts of capital
aggregated by shareholders for the production of goods and ser-
vices. Early corrupt practices acts only applied to candidate cam-
paigns, 15 but as direct legislation provisions were enacted, some
states extended finance controls to ballot-measure campaigns as
well. The usual change was to add the words "political principle
or measure" to the definition of a political committee. 16 This made
all the other provisions referring to duties of political committees
to file expenditure and contribution statements applicable to bal-
lot-measure campaigns. In spite of the simplicity of this change, in
only fifteen of the twenty-three states permitting statewide direct
legislation do campaign finance provisions apply to ballot-measure
campaigns.
1 7
California enacted an entirely new provision specifically de-
signed to control expenditures for or against ballot measures.' 8
The objective of the California provision is to arouse public
interest in large campaign expenditures so that voters can react
12 The following twenty-three states permit initiatives and referenda: ALASKA CONST.
art. XI, §§ 1-8; ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1;ARK. CONST. amend. 7, § 1; CAL. CONST.
ART. IV, §§ 22-24;CoLo. CONST. art. V, § I; IDAHO CONST. art. 3, § 1;ME. CONST. art.
IV, pt. 3, §§ 17- 18; MD. CONST. art. XVI (referendum only); MAss. CONST. §§ 150- 177;
MICH. CONST. art. 2, § 9; Mo. CONST. art. 3, § 49 et seq.; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 1; NEB.
CONST. art 3, §§ 1-4;NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 295.015-.055 (1971); N.M. CONST. art. IV, § I
(referendum only); N.D. CONST. art. II, § 25; OHIo CONST. art. II, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art.
5, § 2; ORE. CONST. art. IV, § 1; S.D. CONST. art. III, § I; UTAH CONST. art. VI, § I;
WASH. CONST. art. Ii, § 1;WYo. CONST. art. 3, § 52.
13 E. SIKES, supra note 5, at 120, quoting Perry Belmont, one of the leading early
advocates of campaign reform.
14 Corrupt & Illegal Practices Prevention Act, 1883, 46 & 47 Vict., c.5 1. See Bottomly,
supra note 6, at 332-49; E. SIKES, supra note 5, at 123; Lucas, The Strength of Ten:
Three Quarters of a Century of Purity in Election Finance, 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 675, 677
(1957).
15 The California provision, Stats. 1893 ch. XVI, §§ 1-5, was typical.
16 See, e.g., MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.901(2) (1967). California enacted a special
new provision, CAL. ELECTIONS CODE §§ 11800- 11834 (West Supp. 1972).
17 ALASKA STAT. § 15.55.010 et seq. (1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-452 (1956);
CAL. ELECTIONS CODE §§ 11800- 11834 -(West 1972); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 1391 et seq. (1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 26 (1971); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
55, §§6- 15 (Supp. 1972); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 168.901-.920 (1967); Mo. ANN.
STAT. §§ 129.200-270 (1966); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§94-1429 to -1434,
94-1444(1969); NEB. REV. STAT.§§32-119, 32-1119 et seq. (1943); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 3-19-1 et seq. (1970); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.08 et seq. (1972); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 260.005 et seq. (1971); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 12-25-1 et seq. (1967);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-346 et seq. (1959).
'
8 CAL. ELECTIONS CODE §§ 11800- 11834 (West 1961), as amended, (West Supp.
1972).
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appropriately at the ballot box.19 The California scheme does not
regulate the total amount spent in initiative campaigns. Rather it is
a disclosure law that seeks to assure that the voters know how
much is spent, by whom, and for what purposes.2 0 Each group
that collects or expends money in a campaign to influence the
actions of voters in statewide ballot-measure elections is consid-
ered an association. 21 Each association must select a treasurer
responsible for collecting, managing, and expending the funds of
the association. 22 The treasurer must file verified statements of
receipts and expenditures with the Secretary of State twice before
and once after the election. 23 While items for which amounts may
be expended are specifically limited by the act, the law does not
prohibit corporate contributions.
Of the remaining fourteen states which control expenditures in
initiative campaigns, 24 only four require statements of contribu-
tions and expenditures both before and after the election. 25 The
majority of the others requires such statements only after the
19 E. SIKES, supra note 5, at 147, believes this to be the primary function of such
statutes.
2 0 This was the intent of the Jones Committee of 1923 which investigated the
effectiveness of the provision regulating ballot-measure expenditures. Its recommendation
was that more thorough disclosure requirements were needed in order to improve the
statute's effectiveness. Report of Special Committee, CAL. SEN. DAILY J., at 1780 et seq.
(May 14, 1923); Brown v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 509, 520, 487 P.2d 1224 (1971);
Comment, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 300, at 316- 18 (1953).
21 CAL. ELECTIONS CODE § 11801 (West Supp. 1972) defines an association as
[A]ny person, committee, firm, association, public or private corporation, or
other group of persons, whether incorporated or not, that for the payment of
expenses in a campaign to influence the action of the voters for or against the
circulation or adoption of any measures voted upon at a statewide, county,
district or municipal election does either or both of the following:
(a) Collects, raises, or receives money or promises of money aggregating
from all sources more than one thousand dollars ($1000).
(b) Expends more than one thousand dollars ($1000) of its own money or
funds.
These organizations collect funds to support or oppose the measure and direct the cam-
paigns. In other states such organizations are called political committees. E.g., MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 168.901(2) (1967):
"Political committee" or "committee" shall apply to every combination of 2
or more persons who shall aid or promote the success or defeat of a candi-
date, or a political party or principle or measure ....
22 The first statement must be filed between forty and forty-five days prior to the
election, the second, between seven and twelve days prior to the election, and the last one
within thirty days after the election. Each statement must be itemized, detailed, and
verified on blank forms supplied by the Secretary of State. They must list the name and
address of each person, firm, or corporation that has contributed or loaned to the associ-
ation any money or services worth twenty-five dollars or more and the amount contributed
by each. Total figures of all funds used for campaign purposes must also be filed. There are
similar provisions requiring disclosure of where the money is spent. CAL. ELECTIONS
CODE, § § 11803- 11834 (West 1961), as amended, (West Supp. 1972).
23 Id. § 11801.
24 See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
2 MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 26 (1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 55, § 16 (1971); NEB.
REV. STAT. § § 32-1120,-1121 (1943); ORE. REV. STAT. § 260.072 (1971).
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election. 26 In view of the fact that disclosures made before the
election allow the voter to formulate his position on the ballot
measure on the basis of who advocates or opposes its adoption,
states requiring disclosure only after the election defeat one of the
major objectives of disclosure requirements. 27
Although the California law does not restrict corporate contri-
butions to ballot-measure campaigns, ten states do absolutely
prohibit contributions by corporations in any election campaign.
28
Formulation of proper controls over campaign spending requires
an awareness of the essential differences between candidate cam-
paigns and initiative campaigns, and it also requires a realization
that, because of these differences, corporations may have a more
legitimate role to play in the latter than in the former. For ex-
ample, the interest of a corporation in a ballot measure directly
affecting its operations is presumably much greater than its in-
terest in any particular candidate who might advocate policies
affecting the corporation. Additionally, interest groups play a
more important role in initiative campaigns than in candidate
campaigns,2 9 and it would seem that corporations, as interest
groups,30 should be allowed to participate. Prohibitions on corpo-
2 6
ALASKA STAT. § 15.55.010 (1962); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-452 (1956); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.906 (1967); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 129.200, .230 (1966); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 94-1431 (1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-19-18 (1953); S.D. COMPILED
LAWS § 12-25-17 (1967).
27 For three reasons stated in Brown v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 509, at 520- 23, 487
P.2d 1224, at 123 1-33, disclosure of contributions and expenditures before the election is
more important in initiative campaigns than in candidate campaigns. First, ballot measures
are devoid of personality and historical background. If voters know who is financing each
side of a campaign they can make their choice on the basis of prior knowledge of the
supporters. Second, it is often difficult to know the precise meaning of initiative measures,
for they may be written in confusing or technical language. Knowledge of sources of
corporate support may aid in the interpretation of a measure. Third, this knowledge must
be available to the voter during the campaign and before the election if it is to influence his
decision. In the campaign on Proposition Nine much of the commentary indicates that
voters were swayed by the revelation of how much was being spent in the campaign and
who was spending it. Without the required statements such information would not have
been available. See San Francisco Chronicle, June 7, 1972, at I, col. 4.
While it is generally agreed that voters seldom have clearly defined opinions about most
ballot measures, Initiative Makes a Big Comeback as Groups Seek to Bypass Legislature
3 CALIF. J. 230 (1972), there is some disagreement about whether voters really are
influenced by the amount campaigners spend. See A. HEARD, supra note 6, at 16-35.
Heard concludes that in an initiative campaign expenditures for organization and commu-
nication purposes more clearly determine the success of the campaign than they do in
candidate campaigns. Nevertheless, as noted above, a significant number of voters reacted
negatively to the highly financed effort of the opponents of Proposition Nine. See also H.
ALEXANDER, MONEY, POLITICS AND PUBLIC REPORTING, (Citizens Research Foundation,
Study No. I 1960).
28 See note 8 supra.
29See V.0. KEY & W. CROUCH, supra note 10, at 507- 10; Wolfinger & Greenstein,
The Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis of Referendum Voting, 62 AM.
POL. ScI. REV. 753, 767 n.41 (1968); Initiative Makes a Big Comeback as Groups Seek to
Bypass Legislature, supra note 27, at 230.
30 See part II A infra.
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rate political contributions generally reflect a fear that the future
public official will be improperly beholden to his financial sup-
porters, especially where resources as vast as those controlled by
a modern corporation are involved.A1 In initiative campaigns,
however, this problem does not exist; such an election is more
analogous to a vote in the legislature, where corporate lobbying is
permitted.3 2 Thus the decreased dangers and increased benefits of
corporate participation in initiative campaigns, as opposed to can-
didate campaigns, make it desirable that legislatures, in devising
regulatory schemes, recognize the legitimate role of corporations
in initiative campaigns.
II. THE LEGITIMACY OF CORPORATE
POLITICAL ACTIVITY
A. The Corporation as an Interest Group
A pattern of association for political purposes pervades Ameri-
can politics. Theorists may point to individual participation in
politics as a basic element of a pluralistic, democratic society, but
individual values are successfully achieved in politics by group
action.33 In initiative campaigns especially, interest group in-
volvement is important to the proper functioning of the political
process.3 4 Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion in United
States v. CIO,3 5 one of the few cases interpreting the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act,3 6 noted, "The expression of bloc senti-
ment is and always has been an integral part of our democratic
electoral and legislative process. They could hardly go on without
it."37 Interest groups inform the electorate of how the enforce-
ment of particular measures would affect them, allowing voters to
balance competing claims.
38
31 See note 6 supra.
32 See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 9900 et seq. (West 1966), as amended, (West Supp. 1972).
33 See E. EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 301-02, 323- 24; See also V. 0. KEY, POLITICS,
PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS (4th ed. 1958); Baratz, Corporate Giants and the Power
Structure, 9 WESTERN POL. Q. 406 (1956).
34 Since a ballot measure has no personality of its own and no necessary connection to
established political parties, the campaign associations on both sides of the issue find it
important to gain the backing of established interest groups. Many voters who have neither
the time nor the inclination to familiarize themselves with complex issues involved in a
ballot proposition may form their opinions on the measure according to the positions taken
by organizations with which they are familiar. See note 27 supra.
35 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
36 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970), as amended, Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 205,
86 Stat. 10.
37335 U.S. at 143.
38 Because the legislature is avoided in ballot-measure campaigns, these proposals evade
the close scrutiny that legislative measures may undergo. The normal legislative process is
[VOL, 6:781
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Corporations have a vital role to play in this process when
ballot measures affect them.39 In the California campaign on the
Clean Environment Act, corporations financed and supported
efforts to defeat the proposed measure, participating in the man-
ner of any other political group striving to achieve its ends. 40
There is a problem in viewing corporations as interest groups in
that corporations may differ from traditional interest groups such
as agricultural organizations or labor unions. Corporations gener-
ally are not organized primarily for political purposes. 4' Despite
any differences, however, it is the similarities between corpo-
rations and ordinary interest groups that prevail.
Direct affiliation of individuals with corporate interests and
activities is more widespread than ever before. Numerous sociolo-
gists have recognized that the modern large corporation provides
a sense of kindredness and common purpose for people. Corpo-
rations are not simply economic institutions, but arenas in which
demands for security, justice, and esteem are made.42 In addition
to social attachments, a significant portion of the population owns
stock in corporations. 43 There has also been a vast increase in
institutional investment in recent years as a result of insurance
and trust programs for the benefit of workers. 44 The public cur-
rently accepts, indeed in some cases demands, broad corporate
involvement in community affairs. As a result of this acceptance,
corporations, or their managers, currently possess some lead-
characterized by a balancing of competing interests in order to play off the concerns of
large groups of citizens. This balancing of interests must be done by the electorate itself in
initiative campaigns. V. 0. KEY & W. CROUCH, supra note 10, at 442-58.
39 See E. EPSTEIN supra note 5; Hazard, supra note 6, at 93; Reagan, The Seven
Fallacies of Business in Politics, 38 HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr., 1960, at 61.
40 Several very large corporations participated in the Proposition Nine campaign. The
Pacific Gas and Electric Co. took a very strong stand on Proposition Nine, enclosing
letters describing its opposition to the measure in each of its customers' bills. San Fran-
cisco Chronicle, May 9, 1972, at II, col. 6; id., May 17, 1972, at 40, col. 7; id., May 23,
1972, at 16, col. 8. An action was filed before the Public Utilities Commission by the
proponents of the measure to stop this activity but the Commission upheld the company's
actions. The following statement by the Bank of America typifies corporate views:
After a thorough analysis of Proposition 9, the Bank of America was con-
vinced that provisions of the proposed measure were not in the best interests
of California. The proposed measure would have been harmful in one way or
another to almost every citizen of the state. As an organization with exper-
tise in economics and responsible concern for the well-being of California
and its citizens, the bank felt and feels that its contribution toward the defeat
of Proposition 9 was both legitimate and advisable.
Suit Won't Stop B ofA Taking Public Stand, AMERICAN BANKER, Aug. 14, 1972, at I, col.
2. See also note 3 supra.
41 See generally A. BERLE, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REPUBLIC 5 (1963); C. WALTON,
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES 82 (1967).
42 Bell, The Corporation and Society in the 1970's, 24 PUB. INTEREST 5, 22-24 (1971).
Bell relies on works of Emile Durkheim and Elton Mayo to support these contentions.
43 H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 186 (2d ed. 1970).
44 Id.
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ership in economic affairs. 45 This was demonstrated in the Propo-
sition Nine campaign when S. D. Bechtel, Sr. and Edgar F.
Kaiser, two leading industrialists, signed a major advertisement
opposing the measure. 46 Businessmen realize their views are
becoming more widely accepted and believe that they should
involve themselves more actively in politics in order to promote
their beliefs.47 Thus because many individuals see an identity
between themselves and a major corporation or large corporations
generally, they look to the corporations for guidance on political
issues. Even where individuals see their interests as generally
opposed to corporate interests, they may still find it helpful to
know where corporations or their officers stand on particular
issues.
Legislative and judicial recognition of the legitimate role of
corporations in politics is reflected in litigation under the criminal
provision of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act (Act).48 That
provision would appear by its terms to prohibit all contributions
by corporations in candidate campaigns, but the United States
Supreme Court has construed the law so as to allow corporations
a relatively broad range of political activity.
In United States v. C10 49 the Court held that it was not a
violation of the Act for the CIO to publish and distribute in the
Washington, D.C. area a copy of the CIO News urging members
to vote for a particular candidate in a Maryland congressional
race as long as the News was published as part of the union's
normal activities. Justice Reed, writing the majority opinion
noted:
If § 3 13 [now Section 610] were construed to prohibit the
publication, by corporations and unions in the regular course
of conducting their affairs, of periodicals advising their mem-
bers, stockholders or customers of danger or advantage to
4 A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (rev.
ed. 1968); Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, in THE CORPORATION
IN MODERN SOCIETY 40 (E. Mason ed. 1959); Bell, supra note 42; Dodd, For Whom Are
Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); Ruder, Public Obliga-
tions of Private Corporations, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 209 (1965); Sorenson, Public Obliga-
tions and the Private Corporation, 49 SATURDAY REV., May 24, 1966, at 24; Note, The
Shareholder's Role in Corporate Social Responsibility, 5 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 68 (197 1).
46 San Francisco Chronicle, June 5, 1972, at 20, col. I.
47 Fenn, Business and Politics, 37 HARV. Bus. REV., May-June, 1959, at 6; Greene-
walt, A Political Role for Business, 2 CALIF. MANAGEMENT REV., Fall, 1959, at 7;
Greyser, Business and Politics, 1968, 46 HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec., 1968, at 4;
Greyser, Business and Politics, 1964, 43 HARV. Bus. REV., Oct., 1964, at 22; Reagan,
supra note 39; Sheldon, Businessmen Must Get into Politics, 37 HARV. Bus. REV.,
Mar.-Apr., 1959, at 37.
48 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970), as amended, Act of Feb. 7, 1972. Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 205,
86 Stat. 10.
49 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
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their interests from the adoption of measures or the election
to office of men, espousing such measures, the gravest doubt
would arise in our minds as to its constitutionality.
50
In United States v. UA W51 the union was charged with spend-
ing union dues in violation of the Act to sponsor a commercial
television broadcast designed to influence the electorate to select
certain candidates in a congressional election. Reviewing the leg-
islative history of Section 610,52 Justice Frankfurter noted that
the Smith-Connally Act of 1943 53 put unions on exactly the same
basis as corporations with regard to the financing of political
activities and that the intended effect of the Act was to proscribe
the expenditure of union dues for commercial broadcasts designed
to urge the public to elect a certain candidate or to support a
particular party.54 The broadcast by the UAW seemed to be
objectionable on these grounds, but the Court found the in-
dictment invalid because it failed to allege specifically whether
dues money or money raised voluntarily was used to finance the
broadcast. Justice Frankfurter went on to suggest several issues
that the lower court should resolve in reconsidering the case. He
felt it was important to know whether the broadcast was paid for
out of general funds and whether it reached members only or the
public at large. Furthermore, Frankfurter believed a distinction
should be made between active electioneering and merely stating
the record of candidates on the issues, implying that the latter was
permissible. Frankfurter also thought that in order for there to be
a criminal violation under the Act the union must have intended
to affect election results.
55
The implication behind these criteria would seem to be that
corporations would be severely restricted in their campaigning
activities, apart from items they might carry in regular company
publications. If corporations could not use general corporate
funds, as opposed to money collected from voluntary contribu-
tions, and in any event were limited to merely "stating the
record," it is hard to imagine that they could function effectively
as political interest groups. In practice, however, corporations
50 Id. at 121.
51352 U.S. 567 (1957).
52 For legislative history of§ 610, see 352 U.S. at 568-584; E. EPSTEIN, CORPO-
RATIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS: FEDERAL REGULATION IN PER-
SPECTIVE 12- 14 (1968); Redish, Reflections on Federal Regulation of Corporate Political
Activity, 21 J. PuB. L. 339, 343-354 (1972).
53 Act of June 25, 1943, ch. 144, 57 Stat. 163, 167, repealed by Act of June 25, 1948,
ch. 645, 62 Stat. 862.
54352 U.S. at 578-79, 587.
55 Id. at 592.
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have not been so strictly limited, as illustrated by United States v.
Lewis Food Co.,5 6 the only case in which these standards have
actually been applied to a corporation. The company had spent
$9,523.68 to publish an advertisement in many California new-
papers entitled "Notice to Voters." 57 The advertisement gave the
voting records of each member of Congress from California and
the California legislature based on the percentage of votes cast by
each member in support of the "free enterprise system, our con-
stitutional government and freedom under God." 58 The court held
this not to be active electioneering, characterizing it as merely
stating the record of candidates on economic issues, despite the
fact that the records were presented in a biased manner. The
origin of the funds for the advertisement was also unclear.59
When the statute is so interpreted, a great deal of room is left
for corporate activities. Any publication within the corporate fam-
ily is permissible, thus allowing letters to shareholders, employ-
ees, and consumers. 60 If publications outside the corporation are
circumscribed no more closely than was done in the Lewis Food
Co. case, then corporations have a substantial range of political
activity open to them.61 The judicial interpretation of the Act has
now been explicitly recognized by Congress. The 1971 Federal
Election Campaign Act amended Section 610 to permit such
activities as communications to stockholders, nonpartisan
get-out-the-vote drives, and promotion of special political funds.
6 2
This affirms that a number of campaign activities, even in candi-
date campaigns, are legitimately op'en to corporations.
63
Although Section 610 applies only to candidate campaigns and
not to initiative campaigns, its history in the courts and in Con-
gress is instructive, as it illustrates the legitimation, at least to a
56 236 F. Supp. 849 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
57 Id. at 851-52.
58 id.
59 Id. at 853-54.
60 Several states however have specific provisions prohibiting employers from placing
political materials in paychecks or around the work area. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 49-21-24 (1963); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.912 (1967); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 94.1424 (1947).
61 See E. EPSTEIN, supra note 5; Garrett, Corporate Contributions for Political Pur-
poses, 14 Bus. LAW 365 (1959); Gossett, The Role of the Corporation in Public Affairs,
15 Bus. LAW. 92 (1959); Wood, Corporate PoliticalActivity, 15 Bus. LAW. 112 (1959).
62 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-225, § 205, 86 Stat. 10.
r3 It is interesting to note that although the Internal Revenue Service does not recognize
such political expenditures as ordinary and necessary business expenses for the purpose of
tax deductions, this is not because such payments are in any sense illegal. The Supreme
Court in Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959), a case involving a contribu-
tion by wholesale beer distributors to defeat an initiative limiting wine and beer sales,
noted that the tax law expresses
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limited extent, of corporate participation in politics. It seems that
the role allowed to corporations in initiative campaigns should be
at least as active as that allowed in candidate campaigns, for in the
former there is no direct personal beneficiary of the corporation's
activities being elected to office.
B. The Corporation as Political Contributor
The primary objection to the expenditure of corporate funds for
political purposes has always been that corporate officials had no
right to use the corporation's funds for contributions to political
activities without the consent of the shareholders. 64 This objec-
tion ignores, however, both the direct interest that modern large
corporations may have in political affairs and changing con-
ceptions of the stockholder's relationship to the corporation. Such
factors are matters of state corporation law and must be deter-
mined from a consideration of permissible corporate powers and
purposes.6 5
Older cases and commentators generally declared all corporate
political expenditures ultra vires and therefore open to attack by
dissenting shareholders in a derivative action.66 It was believed
that there was no relation between political activity and specific
statutory and charter authorizations of corporate purposes. How-
ever, where the law, like California's statute, recognizes that a
corporation may engage in any activity "incidental to the transac-
tion of its business... or expedient for the attainment of its
corporate purposes," 67 political expenditures today may avoid
a determination by Congress that since purchased publicity can influence the
fate of legislation which will affect ... all in the community, everyone in the
community should stand on the same footing as regards its purchase so far as
the Treasury of the United States is concerned.
Id. at 513. The purpose is not to declare such expenses outside of the purpose of the
corporations, but rather to express that it should cost all citizens, individuals and corpo-
rations alike, the same amount to express their political views.
64 United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 113 (1948).
6 Haley, Limitations on Political Activities of Corporations, 9 VILL. L. REV. 593,
611- 13 (1964); Comment, supra note 6, at 842-55 (1961).
66 H. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 85 (rev. ed. 1946); McConnell v.
Combination Mining & Mill Co., 30 Mont. 239, 76 P. 194 (1904); People v. Moss, 187
N.Y. 410,80 N.E. 383 (1907).
The traditional position was that implied powers of corporations, powers other than
those specifically enumerated in the charter or state statute, extended only to things
reasonably necessary to enable the corporation to carry out its purposes. H. HENN, supra
note 43, at § 183. This was not viewed as including the right to make political or charitable
contributions. Illustrative of this view is People v. Gansley, 191 Mich. 357, 158 N.W. 195
(1916). The court specifically noted that corporations have no right to the elective fran-
chise, and thus the privilege of influencing public sentiment at elections is not conferred on
corporations by the state. A federal court took the same position in United States v.
United States Brewers' Ass'n, 239 F. 163, 168 (W.D. Pa. 1916).
6 7
CAL. CORP. CODE § 802(b) (West 1955).
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charges of being ultra vires because of the changed nature of
business-government relations.
In his dissent in International Association of Machinists v.
Street,68 Justice Frankfurter called the notion that economic and
political concerns are separable "pre-Victorian. '-6 9 Government is
now industry's regulator and its biggest customer, so that a corpo-
ration's well-being often depends on political decisions. 70 The
Proposition Nine campaign aptly illustrates the direct economic
interest of corporations in electoral results.7 Contributions to the
campaign were economic investments in the corporations' futures.
It would be difficult to find any violation of corporate purpose
where the economic interests of the corporation are so directly at
stake.
Participation in initiative campaigns will nearly always be with-
in proper corporate powers and purposes. Studies indicate that
the amount given by corporations, or any other interest group,
varies directly with the immediacy of their political concern. 72
Corporations are unlikely to give large sums of money to initiative
campaigns that do not directly affect their businesses. This was
also confirmed in the Proposition Nine campaign where severely
affected industries like power companies and trucking concerns
gave more than banks.
73
Where, as in Proposition Nine, the relation between the elec-
tion issue and the corporation's business activities is clear, corpo-
rate contributions are not ultra vires even under traditional views
of proper corporate activities. 74 These political activities are not
inconsistent with management's fiduciary obligation to share-
holders. Some initiative campaigns, however, may involve only
issues of remote business interest to the corporation. In such
cases, political activity may still be permissible under expanded
views of what actions directly benefit corporations.
88367 U.S. 740 (1961).
69 Id. at 814.
70 J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967); Baratz, supra note 33; Berle,
Corporate Decision-Making and Social Control, 24 Bus. L. 149, 151 (1968); Chayes,
supra note 45, at 27, Cheit, Why Managers Cultivate Social Responsibility, 7 CALIF.
MANAGEMENT REV., Fall, 1964, at 16; Corporations Make Politics Their Business,
FORTUNE, Dec., 1959, at 100; Hetherington, Facts and Legal Theory: Shareholders,
Managers, and Corporate Social Responsibility, 21 STAN. L. REV. 248, 284 (1969).
71 If the proposition had passed, Pacific Gas & Electric could not have built the nuclear
power plants it had planned. Chemical companies could not have sold many of their
pesticide products. Oil companies would have had to undertake major research in order to
change the composition of their fuel products and, until they achieved satisfactory results,
could not have sold any inventory not meeting the new standards. Trucking companies
would have had to stop operating their trucks until the new fuel could be developed.
Consequently, banks would suffer because of the adverse cumulative economic impact.
72
A. HEARD, supra note 6, at 119.
73 See notes 3 and 40 and accompanying text supra.
74 See note 66 supra.
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Previously, corporate benefit meant only economic benefit be-
cause the only legitimate goal of management was profit max-
imization for shareholders. 75 Modern theorists, however, view
corporate benefit in much broader terms. They believe corpo-
rations should benefit consumers, employees, and suppliers as
well as shareholders. 76 Courts have essentially accepted this new-
er view by holding that anything which promotes the general good
advances the corporate weal. 77 Given this judicial attitude, politi-
cal issues which are not even directly business-related may ar-
guably be supported by corporations.
State law defining legitimate powers and purposes of corpo-
rations no longer poses a true obstacle to corporate political
activity. Because of the dramatic change in the relationship be-
tween business and government, corporations can generally show
a direct economic concern with the outcome of initiative elec-
tions. Expanded notions of corporate benefit may even permit
corporate involvement in campaigns in which business interests
relate only marginally to election issues. Nevertheless, this still
leaves the problem of voluntariness of political expression, for
shareholders who disagree with the management's political views
may be forced to contribute against their will. Although this
reasoning might apply as well to unions and their members, in
which membership is often compulsory, it hardly seems applicable
to large public corporations where ownership and control are
separated and the shareholder is merely a passive property owner,
able to invest and reinvest at will.
In the case of International Association of Machinists v.
Street,78 the Supreme Court dealt with the problem of a union
member in a union shop who objected to the use of his com-
pulsory dues to finance campaigns of candidates he opposed and
doctrines in which he did not believe. The fundamental concern of
the Court was the compulsory nature of the member's association
with the union. He had no choice other than to join if he wanted
75 C. WALTON, supra note 4 1, at 82.
76 See note 45 supra.
77 The traditional doctrine was overturned when several corporations after World War
i began to question whether they could make philanthropic or other nonbusiness dona-
tions. A test case was brought in New Jersey. In A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 26 N.J.
Super. 106, 97 A.2d 186 (Ch. 1953), the court held that a contribution to Princeton
University was for the direct benefit of the corporation. The court stated that what
"promotes the general good inescapably advances the corporate weal." Id. at 114, 97 A.2d
at 191. As to any corporate act being ultra vires, or beyond the power of the corporation.
the court found that a corporation possesses powers conferred by its charter and "in-
cidental powers reasonably designed or required to give fuller or greater effect to the
express powers." Id. at 116, 97 A.2d at 192. This case has been repeatedly cited by other
courts in support of the new broader view of corporate power. See Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d
1192 (1955).
78 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
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to work. The majority of the Court held that the Railway Labor
Act, 79 which compelled union membership, did not permit the
union, over the employee's objection, to use his exacted funds to
support political causes which he opposed.
Justice Black in a dissenting opinion thought that the law was
unconstitutional if it required a man to support the expression of
points of view he opposed, but he drew a clear distinction be-
tween voluntary and compulsory organizations: "There ... is no
constitutional reason why a union or other private group may not
spend its funds [politically] if its members voluntarily join it and
can voluntarily get out of it."8O A stockholder, unlike a union
member in a union shop, may withdraw his funds anytime he does
not like the way the corporation is doing business. As long as
political activity is of direct benefit to the corporation, there is no
reason for him to complain that the corporation is using his funds
for political purposes with which he does not agree. The share-
holder is not forced either legally or realistically to be a member
of the group.81
If the shareholder is viewed as a voluntary owner of passive
property, and it is recognized that corporate participation in in-
itiative campaigns is generally of direct economic benefit to corpo-
rations, the old objections to the expenditure of corporate funds
for political purposes seem groundless.
III. NEW CONTROLS OF CORPORATE
CAMPAIGN SPENDING
Because of unrealistic legislative assumptions about the politi-
cal role of corportations, existing corporate campaign contribution
controls have been ineffective. They tend to promote diffusion of
responsibility, concealment, and evasion of the law. The goal of
any system of regulation should be to minimize inhibition of
political activities while shedding maximum light upon them.8 2
Current laws would better meet this goal if they allowed for the
legitimate political role of corporations in initiative campaigns.
Initiative campaigns are unlike candidate campaigns where cit-
izens fear that large contributions by corporations will bias future
7945 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1970).
80367 U.S. at 788 (1961). Justice Black's view was echoed in Justice Douglas' con-
curring opinion:
As long as [the leaders] act to promote the cause which justified bringing the
group together, the individual cannot withdraw his financial support merely
because he disagrees with the group's strategy.
Id. at 778.
81 See note 45 supra.
8
2 See H. ALEXANDER, supra note 27, at 16.
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elected officials. In initiative campaigns, corporate political activ-
ity benefits the public by providing information on how proposed
measures affect business interests. In this sense corporations act
like any other political interest group. Furthermore, the old objec-
tion that corporate officials have no right to use the corporation's
funds for contributions to political activities without the consent
of shareholders is no longer valid in a world in which corporations
can show a direct benefit from the outcome of elections. Share-
holders are not compelled to associate with the corporation and
its activities. Workable regulations of corporate contributions to
initiative campaigns should be consistent with these new political
realities.
Several frequent suggestions for reform may not work well in
initiative campaign regulations. Absolute limits on corporate polit-
ical involvement, either through contribution ceilings or outright
prohibition, force businesses to give money through corporate
officers and small front organizations when they deem it impor-
tant to contribute despite prohibitions.83 This makes control
difficult and weakens any hope of centralizing responsibility for
keeping track of receipts and expenditures. 8 4 Although California
has neither an absolute prohibition of corporate contributions nor
contribution ceilings, many firms still gave through associations
like the Los Angeles Clearinghouse in the Proposition Nine cam-
paign, making it difficult to determine the origin of funds. 85
Some commentators believe that elections should be paid for
with public funds or by large numbers of small contributors. 86 To
achieve these goals, direct appropriations and tax incentives have
been proposed. 87 Even if such plans are feasible in candidate
campaigns, they might not work in initiative campaigns, assuming
constitutional problems could be overcome.8 8 Because ballot mea-
sures arise so frequently and campaigns are controlled by ad hoc
83 E. EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 305-06; Lobel, Federal Control of Campaign Contribu-
tions, 51 MINN. L. REV. 1, 40-41 (1966); Lambert, Corporate Political Spending and
Campaign Finance, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1033, 1038 (1965); Haley, supra note 65, at 614.
84 H. PENNIMAN & R. WINTER, supra note 6, at 40; A. HEARD, supra note 6, at 348;
Bicks & Friedman, Regulation of Federal Election Finance: A Case of Misguided Moral-
ity, 28 N.Y.U.L. REV. 975, 987 (1953); Rosenthal, Campaign Financing and the
Constitution, 9 HARV. J. LEGIS. 359, 362-74 (1972); Note, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1259, 1265
(1953).
85 See Statement of Receipts and Expenditures, on file with the Secretary of State,
Sacramento, California, supra note 3.
86 See Rosenthal, suprt note 84, at 410.
87 Such tax incentives are now in force on the federal level. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, §§ 41, 218. However, a Massachusetts court has held that any direct appropriation
of state funds to political parties to help finance campaigns would not be for a public
purpose and thus is unconstitutional. Opinion of the Justices, 347 Mass. 797, 197 N.E.2d
691 (1964);. Recent Cases, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1260 (1965).
88 See Opinion of the Justices 347 Mass. 797.197 N.E.2d 691 (1964).
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groups, subsidization in any form presents severe administrative
problems.
Only strengthening publicity requirements holds real promise
for reform. New laws should remove, not create, barriers to
divergent group expression, and more positively, bare to public
view the support and policy of the various groups.89 Publicity
assures that a voter may make his decision on the basis of prior
knowledge of each side's financial backers as well as allowing him
to express his reaction to excessive expenditures."a Analysts
agreed after the vote on Proposition Nine that many people voted
for the measure because of their disgust over heavy spending by
the measure's corporate opponents, confirming the view that vot-
ers are concerned about excessive spending.9 1
Several changes in current state provisions are necessary for
effective publicity. Those states with no present regulations
should enact comprehensive new programs. States currently pro-
hibiting all corporate contributions should repeal such provisions
as they apply to initiative campaigns. Publicity is needed before
elections in order that voters have time to study the financial
supporters of each campaign organization and react to excessive
expenditures. States now requiring reports only after elections
should amend their laws.
In order to permit comparison of the contributions and ex-
penditures of the campaign organizations, statutes could require
standardized accounting methods and readable filing forms. All
advertisements published by the campaign organizations might be
required to include the amount of contributions and expenditures
they last reported.
9 2
The election official who received the statements, in most cases
the secretary of state, could also be empowered to audit all of the
statements and search for violations. 93 If violations were dis-
covered the case could be turned over to the attorney general for
appropriate action. Since both the attorney general and secretary
89 See E. EPSTEIN, supra note 5; Bicks & Friedman, supra note 84, at 998.
90 Note, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1259, 1262 (1953). One commentator has written, "The light
of publicity thrown on too generous contributions would, or should, cause such a public
reaction that they would do a party more harm than good. If the public isn't upset, there is
little that any law can do about it." Norton-Taylor, How to Give Money to Politicians,
FORTUNE, May, 1956, at 238.
91 See note 27 supra.
92 H. ALEXANDER, supra note 27, at 7; H. PENNIMAN & R. WINTER, supra note 6, at
40; Bicks & Friedman, supra note 84, at 998; Norton-Taylor, supra note 90, at 238;
Roady, Ten Years of Florida's "Who Gave It- Who Got It" Law, 27 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 434 (1962); Secretary of State Leads Effort to Stiffen State Campaign Financing
Reporting Laws, 3 CALIF. J. at 116 (1972); Note, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1259, 1262 (1953).
93 A special campaign reports committee might be set up to perform these functions as
has been done in Maine. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1399 (1964).
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of state are elected officials subject to political pressures, some
commentators suggest that a central election commission should
administer the entire regulatory program.9 4 This too might pro-
mote more effective publicity.
The electoral system is of great value, and it is only through
realistic controls, consistent with both the nature of initiative
campaigns and the modern role of corporations in society, that it
can be kept free from pernicious influences. The absolutist stric-
tures and omissions of the past no longer adequately control
corporate contributions to initiative campaigns.
- Gail L. Achterman
14 See H. ALEXANDER, supra note 27, at 73; Roady, supra note 92, at 445; see also
note 90 supra.
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